The Frame as a Special Type of Structural and Substantive Concept

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Abstract—The article investigates the frame as a special type of structural and substantive concept. It states that the term frame is correlative to the notion of the concept. The differences between the terms of the frame and the concept is analysed by the author as well. Investigating the sources the author claims that these two objects don’t have significant differences between themselves. The frame is expected to show certain extend of the sphere, though the concept shows the image presented in the area of historical and cultural identity. The concept is realised in the minds of the humans, and they are associated with tokens. The author also refers to the opinion of F.de Saussure about the language and points out the distinguishing features of signifier and signified. F.de Saussure considered those two terms as ideal entities; and he spoke the perfect nature of signified than the signifier. Investigating these notions the author ties to find out some connection between those notions and the notions of the frame and the concept. The author uses various linguistic sources for to prove her opinion about the peculiarities of the concept. The reliable sources have been referred to in the article by the author.

Index Terms—frame, concept, notion, brain, structure, substantive, framework

I. INTRODUCTION

In the complex and relatively stable cognitive discourse of modern linguistics the term "frame" is correlative to the notion of "concept". Very often, as a result of analysis of the literature, it seems that these two concepts do not show significant differences among themselves. Meanwhile, the frame is substantially certain extent of the sphere, while the concept is way of phenomena, the image presented in the area of historical and cultural identity. In our view, the frame corresponds with the concept, but it is not correct to put an equal sign between them.

The term “concept” in science is not new. It was widely used in European philosophy in the Middle Ages. Under the term of concept is generally understood the content of the concept, “its semantic content abstracted from the concrete linguistic form of expression.” In philosophy the logical content of the concept is opposed to its volume. V.F. Asmus points out that "each concept in addition to the idea of its content, i.e. its essential characteristics, also comprises the idea of the totality of the subjects that are covered by the concept. The collection of objects imaginable in the concept is called the volume of this concept" (Asmus 2001, p.92).

The logical understanding of the content and scope of the concepts is traditionally reflected in linguistics. Thus, the meta-language linguistics includes terms such as the extension and the intension. In philosophy, the concepts form the conceptual framework that characterizes the content of a particular concept, the doctrine.

II. METHODOLOGY

The doctrine gains harmony due to the fact that within concept sphere each concept corresponds to a clear definition that reflects its content. Thus, it forms a logical sequence and coherence of concepts which provides clarity and internal consistency of concepts and theories in general.

The term concept in modern linguistics means something different. It is believed that this new understanding of the concept, widely used today, goes back to the works of the Russian philosopher of the last century, S. A. Askoldov. In 1928, in the collection of articles "Russian Speech", issued under the editorship of academician L.V. Scherba, the article by S. A. Askoldov “The Concept and the Word” was published. S. A. Askoldov notes that the nature of the concepts has interested the scientists for a long time, but for some reason, this question still remains open (Askoldov 1928, p.28-44). Here we can immediately notice a discrepancy that the concept is the content of the concept. If it was true, there would be nothing unclear or unsolved for us concerning the concept. The meaning of the concept consists of the essential features of things combined into a single logical class. Due to that, the frame is a special type of structural and substantive concept. S. A. Askoldov himself points out that the concept of medieval terminology corresponds to the "universals." Something else is unclear as well.

III. ANALYSIS

S. A. Askoldov notes that the general concept as well as the content of the act of cognition is still quite a mysterious
value - almost imperceptible flickering of something in mental horizon occurring during rapid utterance and understanding of words such as “justice”, “law”, “right” and the “like” (Askoldov 1928, p.28-44).

It is difficult to understand why the general concept remains a mysterious value. It is clear that these general concepts or universals are based on inductive experience of man's knowledge of the surrounding world. Observing the phenomena of the same class, the human brain learns to allocate them as significant and essential and to distinguish it from the secondary. These essential features that combine things in a single class make the content of the concept. The words "content of a concept, a universal, general concept, or a concept" in medieval terminology is related by virtue with the fact that exactly the kind of universals or content of a concept constitute signification of the lexical meaning or intension. All dictionaries of the world's languages contain just this kind of universals. It is clear that the specific objects enable to highlight the specific features that are relevant to their content. In contrast, the relatively abstract concepts are difficult to be categorized. No matter who and how uses the terms "the concept and the notion", they are correlative.

Moreover, the whole paradigm of correlative terms, characterizing the modern discourse about concepts and conceptual content, are correlative as well. On the one hand, the problem is the distinction between the word and the concept. At the first sight it may seem that this area is clear. However, relatively deep penetration into the essence of the problem reveals a lot of inaccuracies. For example, speaking of these or other concepts we call them words. Therefore, in our mind the concepts are associated with tokens. Both are mental in nature. Here it is useful to recall the fact that de Saussure considered the language as an entire mental phenomenon. As we remember, speaking of the sign structure and distinguishing between the signifier and the signified, Saussure pointed out that both the signifier and the signified are ideal entities. He added that, of course, the signified possesses more perfect nature than the signifier. The value of the notion is really devoid of the material expression. The point of disagreement with the founder of structuralism is usually the thesis of the ideality of meaning, i.e. the form. The fact is that for F.de Saussure the form of the word is not an audible range but an acoustic image of the sound series, or an audio set. Consequently, the form in the language possesses an ideal character as well. With this provision of the Saussurian theory one can either agree or to argue. As it is known, Russian linguists such as L. V. Scherba, V. V. Vinogradov, S. D. Katznelson did not recognize fully the nature of the ideal language (Katznelson 1986, p. 36). It was mostly rejected at the Soviet period which is very clear and explained by ideological considerations.

For us it is important that the material form of the word is pronounced, even if this kind of manifestation is manifested not in the language but speech. The concept is seen as an entirely ideal mental phenomenon. If so, then in the language the concept does not exist as a unit. The concept is a unit of mental vocabulary, the mentality. The concept in the language can only be verbalized. If we recognize the concept as a cultural-historical phenomenon, and thus the system of representations that characterize the national mentality, it is much bulkier than the language units.

IV. DISCUSSIONS

The concept is verbalized; other ways of its representation do not exist. But the concept does not fit in the lexical-semantic system of the language. However, the key to the concept is exactly the word, a lexical unit, as there is no other representation of the concept in the language. The word is the name of the concept, although the content of the word is not equivalent to the content of the concept. For example, there is a set of ideas about "honor" in the mind of the Azerbaijani people. This is very serious for the concept of Azerbaijanis. The concept of "honor", characterizing the Azerbaijani mentality, can not be reduced to the lexical meaning of the words that somehow relate to its content. However, some word should be a key to this concept, and such a word in the Azerbaijani language is the word “qeyrət". However, the relationship of the concept and the word is not limited to this. Since the meaning of the word is a complex phenomenon, it is related to the concept and the level of significance. At the level of form, as already noted, the word is a sign that signals the conceptual space, the key. Just as the key has no relation to the content of the room, so the word itself is not related to the conceptual content. Meanwhile, even the names of many works in modern linguistics suggest that researchers often simply do not distinguish between the concept and the word or token. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasize that the word and the token also tend not to be delimited. For example, N.A. Kulchinskaya called the article "Frame as the Type of Lexical Concept." It follows that the concepts can be lexical and not lexical. In addition, analysis of the name clearly shows that N.A. Kulchinskaya considers the frame as the kind of lexical concept (Kulchinskaya 1986, p.36).

The term lexical is uniquely correlated with the word. The word, if to ignore the theoretical difference between the token and the word, is a non-separable sound complex, in the flow of speech released by the breaks from two sides and correlative with the image of the object, phenomenon, action, sign, etc. So the word is concrete and it is the only reason that it can serve as the denotation of a huge, almost infinite number of things. Nothing else, i.e. no other linguistic or extralinguistic phenomenon, in our opinion, can take on such a definition as “lexical”. Only the sign can be lexical. It is a complex of mental entities such as the concept of a class of objects, the object image, and attitude to denoting objects. There is a lexicalization, i.e. turning the notion into the word. This is mainly due to the acquisition of independent lexical meaning. In the past, as we know, the term lexicalization was used in relation to the process of formation of phraseological units. The researchers proceeded from the assumption that the phrase in the process of losing by its components of their meaning, acquires the semantic autonomy of global importance, integral value, without breaking up into separate meanings of its components. If the phrase, according to them, becomes globally important, it is lexicalized,
i.e. it turns into a word, a lexical sign. At the same time they are not bothered by the fact that the idiom targeted by lexicalization sign, keeps the outer formal identity with the phrase. The components of phraseologism, losing semantic independence, do not merge. If they are merged formally, then only on the basis of free word combinations form a compound word. In fact, of course, legitimate lexicalization could only be called a process.

In itself globality of the nomination of phraseologism with external separateness does not give ground at a theoretical level to regard this process as lexicalization. However, as noted above, such representation existed, and most distinctly they are represented in the works of one of the most prominent representatives of Russian and Soviet linguistics of the twentieth century A.I. Molotkov. The author of the famous "Phraseology of the Russian Language", A.I. Molotkov in his monography, and the dictionary persistently calls value phraseologism lexical meaning. For example, in a theoretical introduction to the dictionary in the "Lexical Meaning of the Phraseologism" section, he writes that "lexical meaning of phraseologism is one of its categorical, or defining, features". The same is observed in the book "Fundamentals of Phraseology of the Russian language". The third chapter is called "The semantics of phraseological units", and the first paragraph of this chapter is "General and Particular Lexical Meaning of Phraseologism" (Molotkov 1977, p. 82).

In Azerbaijan linguistics the cases of ignoring the categorical features of the word also occur. For example, a well-known Azerbaijan linguist H. Mirzoev believes that phrases like xəbor vermək, arzu etmək, iş görmək etc. are not phrases, but words, referring to the factors of semantic matching. For example, xəbor vermək is the same as xəbləmək, arzu etmək - arzulamaq, iş görmək - ışləmək. We can say that these phrases differ from conventional free phrases by their resistance, which, of course, is motivated by a high degree of semantic fusion of the components. H. Mirzoev also keeps this opinion and does not refer them to the phraseology. The bottom line is that the components of these phrases semantic retain independence (Mirzoev 1986, p.20).

Furthermore, semantic analysis of these phrases and the corresponding words shows that they do not exhibit a maximum identity. Even at the level of invariants it is quite possible to identify their features. At the level of the context and situational variation one can not insure against the detection of nuances. A word or lexical sign, in our opinion, is the most specific language unit, and there is no reason to mix it with the other language units. If we talk about the unity of the word, it is necessary to take into account all its categorical attributes. It is not correct to come only from the content and ignore the form. These principles do not give grounds to speak about the lexical concept. In our opinion, the very expression of the lexical concept is a kind of an oxymoron. In numerous studies on cognitive linguistics the fundamental difference between the token and the concept are highlighted. In our opinion, the most important difference is the fact that the concept does not possess a semiotic nature, as opposed to words. Therefore, the phrase lexical concept is erroneous, for the reason that it makes an attempt to bring the concept to the semiotic level.

In this context, in our opinion, it is better to consider another aspect of the ratio between the concept and the word. So, it would seem possible to hold the demarcation line between the word and the concept, based on the fact that the concept is entirely mental categories, while the word has a material expression. In our usual notions the word realizes itself according to three parameters, and if the content is ideal, the form is materially expressed. The form of words is associated with the complex of sounds, and the sounds are a natural phenomenon. As for the function of speech, it is in some way a duty of the language system. In this case, the function of naming, or the nominative function is considered. The function is not materially expressed objectivity either, but rather realizes the relation between the objects. For example, the function of the object A is a representation of the object B. Therefore, the object A is the subject of the denotation of B. It is assumed that the object A is materially expressed, while the object B is implied, i.e. it is ideal. It is no accidental in the history of linguistics that there have been so many attempts to determine the meaning of words through the real objects, which they are called by.

Modern linguistics, even today is associated with the name of Ferdinand de Saussure basing on the fact that everything is ideal in the language. The fact is that the form of words in this case is not the complex of sounds, but only the acoustic image of this complex of sounds, "image acoustique". As we know, this was due to the general semiotic concepts of Saussure and his fundamental dichotomy of language and speech. We also know that many (even outstanding) linguists have hardly accepted the contents of the main dichotomy in Saussurian concept. The problem was, on the one hand, in the perception of such a phenomenon as a collective way of thinking, which was declared as natural heritage of language. On the other hand, apart of the semiotic system of the collective memory is meant.

In particular, texts stored in folk memory were withdrawn outside the language, because they were not relevant to the system, being just the direct implementation of its features. The fact of memorability and reproductibility could not serve as a basis for the inclusion of the vast amount of texts, for example the folk ones, into the language. It is known that some scientists such as academician L.V. Scherba did not recognize Saussure's attitude to language, assuming that all reproducible texts also refer to the language. According to Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic concepts, the language system comprises only the signs of a semiotic nature, the relationship between the marks, as well as functions that perform a linking role between the signs and those phenomena of thought and material reality, which are designated by semiotic systems (Saussure 1977, p.16). These facts referred to as natural languages. Nothing else is included into and is associated with the system of language. This point is very important because it carries out a fundamental and principal border between the different views on the nature of language. As already mentioned, during the rule of undivided system-structural paradigm there existed a different perspective on language, which did not separate it from the collective memory that stores the text fundamental for ethnic groups. In this case, the language
combined in itself above mentioned characters, their relationships and functions with the texts. The essential point, uniting this view with a pure Sossúrian view was the fact that the systems of language and texts were the heritage of ethnic memory, i.e. mental in nature (Saussure 1977, p. 20). Contemporary cognitive linguistics also understands the theoretical postulates that language is directly connected with thinking, mentality and memory. The special role here is played by the texts, i.e. cognitivism assumes that the texts reflect in themselves the results of cognitive activity of ethnic thinking. Moreover, the text is between the individual and the world. This understanding of the key concepts of modern language opens new studies of all these categories, including "notion", "concept", "gestalt", "token", "significance", "denotat" and finally the frame. For example, if we consider natural language-based texts and concepts-mental entities represented in the texts, then it is logically quite right to consider the concepts as the fact of language systems. It should also be noted that this view of the nature of the concept of language as a linguistic reality also implies the consistency, but in this case we have to consider the consistency of the texts that are remembered, stored and reproduced. As the concept is the idea about things, objects and phenomena of the external world that characterizes the national mentality, these representations should be manifested and become apparent. The only space in which they may occur is the language. But if the text is considered a linguistic fact, the concept becomes the fact of the language. It only remains to find out the features of the form, content and function of the language units or entities. If they are facts of the mental dictionary, the form should be considered as just the system of texts, in which they are implemented, or manifested, or verbalized. As a matter of fact, nothing changes depending on the use of various terms. However, the actual ratio for this context of notions reveals that our misunderstanding is associated mainly with the tokens of the frame and concept. However, these concepts are quite amenable to delineate. In our view, a lexeme (word) intersects both the concept and the frame, and intersects at both formal and meaningful level. It can be supposed that token and concept are intersected at a functional level. At the formal level, the word as the title relates to the concept of reality, for the simple reason that in terms of the conceptual content it is the key word to that, and there are not any other keys. It should be absolutely clear that the lexical meaning of the word (lexical content) is not the same as the content of the concept. Moreover, they do not match, neither quantitatively or qualitatively. The word most neutrally and generally represents and labels the concept, but meaningful relation in no way discloses it.

V. CONCLUSION

With regard to the concept, it is verbalized in the whole system of language units but denoted only in the key word. The frame and the concept relate to the level of mental image and are linked with the facts (Whorf 1956, p.90). It is quite difficult to distinguish between the frame and the concept. Of course, it can be assumed that the concept includes the full amount of beliefs about a particular phenomenon, constituting a significant fragment of the world. As for the frame, it includes not only view, but also a complete picture of the actions, constitution or constitutional system, which includes everything that is associated with this concept.

For example, if you analyze such a fundamental concept of human mentality as “food”, the significance of the lexical meaning of the word “food” in the Russian language, “yemək” in Azeri, “food” in English -it can be defined as “what is served as meals. Significance of the lexical value does not change from culture to culture, from language to language which is clear and beyond doubt. But it is evident that the concept changes from culture to culture. So, “food” is different for Azerbaijani (as synonymous with traditional Azerbaijani cuisine), for Russians is quite another, and has a completely different associative mechanism for Englishmen. Equally differentiating the perceptions of the traditional feast, one concept (“food”) moves into another (“feast”), manifests a systematic linguistic picture of the world. The concept of “feast” mentally-associatively and linguistically shifts into the concept “hospitality”, etc. Such transitions and their mechanism are carried out at the expense of not only of the concepts but also frames. The frame in this case turns out to be a better concept, since it covers the associations of various concepts. Thus, the only real difference from the frame is that the concept turns the output of all sorts of associative chain. It is clear that such associations can be associated with the images of things, phenomena, action signs, peculiarities of situations, stereotypical actions. It is the way how the internal form of the term “frame” is realized. “Frameness” primarily means completeness. The idea of finality is quite rightly regarded as the coverage of all associative chains of the frame semantics. But as the frames are also treated and evaluated by us as mental entities, we have to consider the possibility of verbalization of the frames. It is clear that this verbal system of the frames will vary from language to language.

REFERENCES

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